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We propose a reference-frame-independent measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution with uncharacterized quantum bits. We show the security of the protocol. The protocol can
also be useful for a channel that has a very low bit error rate but suffers a large, uncontrolled (but
slow), unitary rotation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum key distribution (QKD) is an appeal-
ing field theoretically as well as practically [1]. After
the security of the QKD had been shown for ideal de-
vices [2, 3], problems due to imperfect devices surfaced.
Although the problems due to imperfect source were re-
solved [4], those due to imperfect detectors still remained
[5–7]. Device-independent QKD’s elegantly overcome the
problems [8]. However, a device-independent QKD is not
yet feasible. With this as background, a measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD was proposed [9]. The
MDI QKD is secure under the assumption that the source
is ideal; that is, the source is exactly in the prescribed
quantum state. The MDI QKD with uncharacterized
quantum bits (qubits) adapts an assumption that the
source is within a two-dimensional subspace [10, 11].
(The latter assumption is weaker than the former be-
cause the prescribed states are already two-dimensional.
In the former case, we need characterization process to
estimate how close the source is to the prescribed one.)
The assumption of two-dimensionality is “not too strin-
gent in many practical and BB84 systems. For exam-
ple, in phase-encoding systems, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the encoding states are in two-dimensional
subspaces...[11]”. The MDI QKD with un-characterized
qubits was recently improved to get higher key rates and
simpler derivations [12]. On the other hand, a proto-
col that dispenses with the shared reference frame, the
reference-frame-independent (RFI) QKD was proposed
[13]. It was observed that RFI QKD is also useful for a
channel with uncontrolled unitary rotation along an axis
[14]. The security of the RFI MDI QKD was also as-
sured under the assumption of ideal source [14]. However,
the security of the RFI MDI QKD with uncharacterized
qubits not yet been shown.
In this paper, we present the security of the RFI MDI
QKD with uncharacterized qubits. In Section II, we
briefly review the (improved) MDI QKD with uncharac-
terized qubits. In Section III, we show the security of the
RFI MDI QKD with uncharacterized qubits. In Section
IV, we discuss our results and present conclusions.
II. MDI QKD WITH UNCHARACTERIZED
QUBITS
For the protocol [11], each user prepares two encoding
states. Let the states prepared by Alice and Bob be de-
noted by |ϕm〉 and |ϕ′n〉, respectively, where m,n = 0, 1.
Here, nothing is supposed about the encoding states,
namely, they are uncharacterized. Each user also pre-
pares a checking state, which is assumed to be a superpo-
sition of the encoding states. Alice’s and Bob’s checking
states are, respectively,
|ϕ2〉 = c0|ϕ0〉+ c1eiθ|ϕ1〉,
|ϕ′2〉 = c′0|ϕ′0〉+ c′1eiθ
′ |ϕ′1〉. (1)
Here, cm and c
′
n are non-negative numbers and, θ and θ
′
are real. The protocol is as follows:
(1) Alice generates a random number i where i =
0, 1, 2. She sends a state |ϕi〉 to Charlie. Here, Char-
lie can be anyone, so Charlie can be either Eve (eaves-
dropper) or the users themselves. (2) Bob independently
generates a random number j where j = 0, 1, 2. He also
sends a state |ϕ′j〉 to Charlie. (3) Charlie performs a mea-
surement on the states |ϕi〉 and |ϕ′j〉. The measurement
can be any one that finally gives two outcomes 0 and 1.
Charlie announces the outcome. (4) When the outcome
is 0, the users discard the data. Otherwise, they keep the
data. By sacrificing some of the data for public discus-
sion, the users estimate, p1ij , the conditional probability
to get outcome 1 for each i, j. (5) Measurement data with
both i and j less than 2 become the raw key. Other data
with either i or j as 2 are used for checking purposes.
The users do postprocessing to get the final key.
Now let us consider Charlie’s measurement on the
states |ϕi〉 and |ϕ′j〉. In the most general collective at-
tack, Eve attaches an ancilla |e〉 to the states and then
applies a unitary operation to them [11]:
UEve|ϕi〉|ϕ′j〉|e〉|0〉M
=
√
p0ij |Γ0ij〉|0〉M +
√
p1ij |Γ1ij〉|1〉M . (2)
Eve gets the outcome by measuring the quantum state
indexed by M in the basis of |0〉 and |1〉. Consider only
the data with the measurement outcome 1 is sufficient
because those with 0 are discarded. For convenience, let
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2us omit 1 from now on; |Γ1ij〉 ≡ |Γij〉 and p1ij ≡ pij . Now
we can see that Eqs. (1) and (2) give the constraints
√
p2n |Γ2n〉 = √p0n c0|Γ0n〉+√p1n c1eiθ|Γ1n〉, (3)√
pm2 |Γm2〉 = √pm1 c′0|Γm0〉+
√
pm1 c
′
1e
iθ′ |Γm1〉,(4)
√
p22 |Γ22〉 =
∑
m,n
√
pmn cmc
′
ne
iθmeiθ
′
n |Γmn〉, (5)
where θ0 = θ
′
0 = 0, θ1 = θ, and θ
′
1 = θ
′. The constraints
(3)-(5) play key roles in the security analysis.
For theoretical purposes, we consider an equiva-
lent entanglement distillation protocol [3, 15]. In
the hypothetical protocol, Alice and Bob prepare en-
tangled states (1/
√
2)(|0〉A1 |ϕ0〉A2 + |1〉A1 |ϕ1〉A2) and
(1/
√
2)(|0〉B1 |ϕ′0〉B2 + |1〉B1 |ϕ′1〉B2), respectively. Alice
and Bob send quantum states indexed by A2 and B2 to
Charlie, respectively. According to Charlie’s announce-
ment about when the measurement outcome is 1, the
users postselect their qubits indexed by A1 and B1, re-
spectively. The postselected state is given by [11]
ρ =
1
p00 + p11 + p01 + p10
·∑
q
P[
√
p00γ
q
00|0〉A1 |0〉B1 +
√
p11γ
q
11|1〉A1 |1〉B1
+
√
p01γ
q
01|0〉A1 |1〉B1 +
√
p10γ
q
10|1〉A1 |0〉B1 ]. (6)
Here P[x] ≡ |x〉〈x|, |Γmn〉 ≡
∑
q γ
q
mn|q〉, where |q〉
is a set of orthonormal states. From normalization,∑
q |γqmn|2 = 1. We consider four Bell states |ϕ±α〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|00〉±ei(αA+αB)|11〉) and |ψ±α〉 = (1/√2)(|01〉±
ei(αA−αB)|10〉), which are obtained by rotating each qubit
by Pauli operator σz with amounts αA and αB , respec-
tively. The final key rate is given by R = 1 − H(eb) −
H(ep), where H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the
binary Shannon entropy, and eb and ep are the bit and
the phase error rates, respectively. The bit error rate is
given by
eb = 〈ψ+α|ρ|ψ+α〉+ 〈ψ−α|ρ|ψ−α〉
=
p01 + p10
p00 + p11 + p01 + p10
(7)
for arbitrary αA and αB . The phase error rate is given
by
ep = 〈ϕ−α|ρ|ϕ−α〉+ 〈ψ−α|ρ|ψ−α〉
≤ eb +
∑
q |
√
p00γ
q
00 − ei(αA+αB)
√
p11γ
q
11|2
2(p00 + p11 + p01 + p10)
. (8)
Let us consider the quantity to be bounded. We get
∆ =
∑
q
|√p00γq00 − ei(αA+αB)
√
p11γ
q
11|2
= p00 + p11 − 2√p00√p11 Re [ei(αA+αB)〈Γ00|Γ11〉],
(9)
where Re [z] is the real part of a complex number z [12].
From constraint (5), we get
Re [ei(θ+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≤
|√p22 +√p01c0c′1 +
√
p10c1c
′
0|2 − p00c20c′02 − p11c21c′12
2
√
p00
√
p11c0c′0c1c
′
1
(10)
by || |A〉 + |B〉|| ≤ || |A〉|| + || |B〉|| where |A〉, |B〉 are
arbitrary states and || |A〉|| is the norm of |A〉. We nu-
merically upper bound Re [ei(θ+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] by using the
inequality (10) with the constraints (1),(3), and (4) (Also
refer to Eqs. (9),(10), and (14) in Ref. [12].)
Consider a case when the upper bound is negative,
that is, Re [ei(θ+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≤ −|Ω|; then we can see
that |〈Γ00|Γ11〉| is lower bounded by the absolute value
of the upper bound, |〈Γ00|Γ11〉| ≥ |Ω|. Now it is easy to
see that we can always choose αA + αB such that
∆ ≤ p00 + p11 − 2√p00√p11 |Ω|. (11)
Now we can get the upper bound for the phase error rate
by inequalities (8) and (11), from which we can get the
final key rate [12].
III. RFI MDI QKD WITH
UNCHARACTERIZED QUBITS
Consider a channel affected by an uncontrolled unitary
rotation along an axis. Unless actively adjusted, nor-
mally the rotation increases bit or phase errors such that
no key remains. However, even without active adjust-
ment, RFI QKD’s enable key generation in this situation
[13, 14]. Here we provide the security of the RFI MDI
QKD with uncharacterized qubits: First we introduce
more checking states and then we get more bounds for
the real part of the inner product 〈Γ00|Γ11〉 (multiplied
by some phase). Using the bounds, we lower bound ab-
solute value of the inner product. Then we can get final
key rate from the absolute value of the inner product, as
in Section II.
The RFI MDI QKD with uncharacterized qubits is al-
most the same as the MDI QKD with uncharacterized
qubits described in Section II. The only difference is that,
Alice and Bob each generate one more checking-state
|ϕ3〉 = c˜0|ϕ0〉+ c˜1eiθ˜|ϕ1〉 and |ϕ′3〉 = c˜′0|ϕ′0〉+ c˜′1eiθ˜
′ |ϕ′1〉,
respectively, so i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3 here. (In Ref. [11], the case
of two checking states for each user is also considered, but
actually only a pair of checking states is used.) Thus four
combinations of checking states exist: (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2),
and (3, 3). For each combination, using an inequality
corresponding to the inequality (10), we independently
upper bound real part of inner product 〈Γ00|Γ11〉 multi-
plied by some phase. For example, for the (2, 3) pair of
3checking states, we get the upper bound by using
Re [ei(θ+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≤
|√p23 +√p01c0c˜′1 +
√
p10c1c˜
′
0|2 − p00c20c˜′0
2 − p11c21c˜′1
2
2
√
p00
√
p11c0c˜′0c1c˜
′
1
.
(12)
Consequently we get four upper bounds: one
each for Re [ei(θ+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉], Re [ei(θ+θ˜′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉]
Re [ei(θ˜+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉], and Re [ei(θ˜+θ˜′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉].
From the constraint (5), we can also get lower bounds
for the four quantities. (Also refer to Eq. (14) in Ref.
[12].) For example, for the (2, 3) pair,
Re [ei(θ+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] ≥
|√p23 −√p01c0c˜′1 −
√
p10c1c˜
′
0|2 − p00c20c˜′0
2 − p11c21c˜′1
2
2
√
p00
√
p11c0c˜′0c1c˜
′
1
.
(13)
Here we used || |A〉 + |B〉 + |C〉|| ≥ || |A〉|| − || |B〉|| −
|| |C〉||. Note that the four quantities are now between the
lower and the upper bounds. For example, the quantity
Re [ei(θ+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] is between the bounds in Eqs. (12)
and (13).
Using the bounds for the four quantities, we can lower
bound the absolute value of the inner product. Let
us suppose that the channel undergoes depolarization
and a (unitary) rotation along z with angle Θ. We
denote a qubit in the x-y plane in the Bloch sphere
[15], (1/
√
2)(|0〉 + eiφ|1〉), by |Φ = φ〉. For examples,
|Φ = 0〉 denotes (1/√2)(|0〉+ |1〉) and |Φ = pi/2〉 denotes
(1/
√
2)(|0〉 + i|1〉). Now let us suppose that |ϕ0〉 = |0〉,
|ϕ′0〉 = |1〉, |ϕ1〉 = |1〉, |ϕ′1〉 = |0〉, |ϕ2〉 = |Φ = 0〉,
|ϕ′2〉 = |Φ = pi〉, and |ϕ3〉 = |pi/2〉 |ϕ′3〉 = |Φ = |3pi/2〉,
and that the measurement element for outcome 1 is
|ψ−〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉). Then the probabilities
corresponding to the bit error rate eb are p00 = p11 =
(1/2)(1 − eb), p10 = p01 = (1/2)eb, p20 = p21 = p02 =
p12 = p30 = p31 = p03 = p13 = 1/4, and
p22 = (1− eb)1
4
(1 + cos Θ) + eb
1
2
,
p23 = (1− eb)1
4
(1 + cos[
pi
2
+ Θ]) + eb
1
2
,
p32 = (1− eb)1
4
(1 + cos[
pi
2
−Θ]) + eb 1
2
,
p33 = (1− eb)1
4
(1 + cos Θ) + eb
1
2
. (14)
First let us consider an ideal case of zero depolariza-
tion. Then we have p00 = p11 = 1/2, p10 = p01 = 0, p20 =
p21 = p02 = p12 = p30 = p31 = p03 = p13 = 1/4,
p22 = p33 = (1/4)(1 + cos Θ), p23 =
1
4 (1 + cos[
pi
2 + Θ]),
and p32 = (1/4)(1 + cos[
pi
2 −Θ]). Now one can easily see
that
Re [ei(θ+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = cos Θ,
Re [ei(θ+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = cos[pi
2
+ Θ],
Re [ei(θ˜+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = cos[pi
2
−Θ],
Re [ei(θ˜+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = cos Θ; (15)
the normalization for Eq. (1) and the constraints
(3) and (4), combined with the probabilities, give
c0 = c1 = c0′ = c1′ = (1/
√
2). Then combined with
the inequalities (12) and (13), and the probabilities,
we can get the second expression in Eq. (15). The
others can be obtained in the same way. Let us
consider the case Θ = pi/4, (which corresponds to
the maximal violation of the Bell inequality [15]), or
Re [ei(θ+θ
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = 1/
√
2,Re [ei(θ+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] =
−1/√2,Re [ei(θ˜+θ′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = 1/
√
2, and
Re [ei(θ˜+θ˜
′)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] = 1/
√
2. If we set
〈Γ00|Γ11〉 = |〈Γ00|Γ11〉|eiδ = reiδ, δ + θ + θ′ = A,
θ˜′ − θ′ = B, and θ˜ − θ = C, we obtain Re [reiA] =
1/
√
2,Re [rei(A+B)] = −1/√2,Re [rei(A+C)] = 1/√2,
and Re [rei(A+B+C)] = 1/
√
2. We can see that these
four equalities can be satisfied only by that the inner
product r = 1 with A = ±pi/4, B = ±pi/2, C = ∓pi/2, by
either geometric intuition or numerical method. From
the lower bound on the size of the inner product r,
we can calculate the final key rate; the lower bound
on the size of the inner product gives the difference
between the phase error and the bit error rates,
[p00 + p11 − 2√p00√p11 |Ω|]/[2(p00 + p11 + p01 + p10)],
where |Ω| is the lowerbound on the inner product size r.
The final key rate is given by R = 1 − H(eb) − H(ep).
Thus the size of the inner product r = 1 means that the
final key rate is one.
Now let us consider the realistic non-zero depolar-
ization case. The four quantities Re [eiA〈Γ00|Γ11〉],
Re [ei(A+B)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] Re [ei(A+C)〈Γ00|Γ11〉], and
Re [ei(A+B+C)〈Γ00|Γ11〉] are between the upper and
the lower bounds, as we have seen. The upper and the
lower bounds can be numerically obtained; numerical
optimization of the inequalities (12) and (13) with the
probabilities just above Eq. (14) and the constraints
(1),(3), and (4), gives the upper and the lower bounds
for the second quantity Re [ei(A+B)〈Γ00|Γ11〉]. Bounds
for other three quantities can be obtained in the same
way. Then we can get the lower bound on the size of
the inner product by using a numerical method and
the bounds on the four quantities. Then we obtain the
final key rate, which is shown in Fig 1. Here we can
see that when the bit error rate eb is less than around
1%, the final key rate is non-zero regardless of rotation
angle. Although the bit error rate’s threshold is quite
low, there is an advantage; active control of the rotation
is not necessary. In particular, the protocol is very
useful for an implementation, such as the which-path
qubit implementation [14], with a channel that has a
4FIG. 1: Final key rates for various angles and bit error rates.
The final key rates for angles from pi to 2pi are the same as
those for angles from 0 to pi which is shown.
very low bit error rate but suffers uncontrolled unitary
rotation. Here the unitary rotation may be uncontrolled
but should be slow enough such that amount of accumu-
lated data for a certain fixed angle is large enough for
post-processing to extract the key. One might say that
even in the non-RFI MDI QKD keys may be distributed
if the rotation is slow. However, in the non-RFI case,
active angle adjustment in the hardware of the protocol
is necessary while in our protocol no physical adjustment
is necessary. Even when the rotation is not slow, key
generation is still possible [16] but the protocol is not
MDI; thus the problem of imperfect detectors remains
[5–7].
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
For angles 0, pi/2, and pi, the final key rates are higher
than those for other angles. This is because in these
cases, at least one of the probabilities p22, p23, p32, or
p33 has either the maximum value 1/2 or minimum value
0; In the MDI QKD with uncharacterized qubits, when
the probabilities for checking states is either maximized
or minimized, the gap between the phase and the bit
error rates become small; thus more keys are generated.
As is also observed in Fig 1, the minimum case, Θ = pi,
is more efficient than the maximum case, Θ = 0. Thus
usually the minimum case is adapted in the (non-RFI)
MDI QKD with uncharacterized qubits [11, 12].
To summarize, we proposed a RFI MDI QKD with un-
characterized qubits. We showed that key cound be gen-
erated for a bit error rate up to around 1% for a channel
of uncontrolled, (but slow) unitary rotation in addition
to depolarization. The protocol can also be useful for the
implementation with that channel.
Acknowledgement
We are grateful to Dr. Hongyi Su for assisting with
the numerical works. This study was supported by In-
stitute for Information and Communications Technology
Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea Govern-
ment (MSIP) (No. R0190-18-2028, Practical and Secure
Quantum Key Distribution).
[1] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M.
Dusek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys.
81, 1301 (2009).
[2] D. Mayers, J. ACM 48, 351 (2001).
[3] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441
(2000).
[4] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[5] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A
74, 022313 (2006).
[6] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quantum
Inf. Comput. 7, 073 (2007).
[7] C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, K. Tamaki, and H.-K. Lo, Phys.
Rev. A 75, 032314 (2007).
[8] A. Ac´ın, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and
V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007).
[9] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
130503 (2012).
[10] Z.-Q. Yin, C.-H. F. Fung, X. Ma, C.-M. Zhang, H.-W.
Li, W. Chen, S. Wang, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Phys.
Rev. A 88, 062322 (2013).
[11] Z.-Q. Yin, C.-H. F. Fung, X. Ma, C.-M. Zhang, H.-W.
Li, W. Chen, S. Wang, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Phys.
Rev. A 90, 052319 (2014).
[12] W.-Y. Hwang, H.-Y. Su, and J. Bae, Phys. Rev. A 95,
062313 (2017).
[13] A. Laing, V. Scarani, J. G. Rarity, and J. L. O’Brien,
Phys. Rev. A 82, 012304 (2010).
[14] Z.-Q. Yin, S. Wang, W. Chen, H.-W. Li, G.-C. Guo, and
Z.-F. Han, Quantum Inf. Process. 13, 1237 (2014).
[15] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation
and Quantum Information, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, U.K., 2000).
[16] T. Pramanik, B. K. Park, Y.-W. Cho, S.-W. Han, Y.-S.
Kim, and S. Moon, Phys. Lett. A 381, 2497 (2017).
